## Two-layered logics for paraconsistent probabilities

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## Classical vs paraconsistent probabilities

Measures

$$
\mu\left(\bigcup_{i \in I} E_{i}\right)=\sum_{i \in I} \mu\left(E_{i}\right)
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- However, if we interpret measures as our degrees of certainty in a given event based on the information at hand, this is not the case.
- Different trusted sources can contradict one another.
- Sources can give contradictory accounts or give no account at all.

We need a (paraconsistent) probability theory that can accommodate this.

# (1) A logic for non-classical event description 

## (2) Probabilities over BD

## (3) Two-layered logics for paraconsistent probabilities

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What do we need?
A propositional logic with $\neg, \wedge$, and $\vee$ that

- does not make contradictions unsatisfiable (otherwise, the measure of a contradictory event is 0 );
- allows the instances of the excluded middle to be non-true (otherwise, the measure of $p \vee \neg p$ is always 1 even if there is no information on $p$ );
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We don't need implication!

- Classically, $\phi \rightarrow \chi \equiv \neg \phi \vee \chi$.
- Intuitively, conditional statements do not describe events.


## Belnap-Dunn logic

$$
\mathscr{L}_{\mathrm{BD}} \ni \phi:=p \in \operatorname{Prop}|\neg \phi|(\phi \wedge \phi) \mid(\phi \vee \phi)
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The idea

- Classical intuitions of $\neg, \wedge, \vee$ remain.
- Truth and falsity become independent to model contradictory and incomplete information.


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## Frame semantics of BD

For a model $\mathfrak{M}=\left\langle W, v^{+}, v^{-}\right\rangle$with $v^{+}, v^{-}: \operatorname{Prop} \rightarrow 2^{W}$, define $w \vDash^{+} \phi$ and $w \vDash^{-} \phi$.

$$
\begin{array}{rlllll}
w \vDash^{+} p & \text { iff } & w \in v^{+}(p) & w \vDash^{-} p & \text { iff } & w \in v^{-}(p) \\
w \vDash^{+} \neg \phi & \text { iff } & w \vDash^{-} \phi & w \vDash^{-} \neg \phi & \text { iff } & w \vDash^{+} \phi \\
w \vDash^{+} \phi \wedge \phi^{\prime} & \text { iff } & w \vDash^{+} \phi \text { and } w \vDash^{+} \phi^{\prime} & w \vDash^{-} \phi \wedge \phi^{\prime} & \text { iff } & w \vDash^{-} \phi \text { or } w \vDash^{-} \phi^{\prime} \\
w \vDash^{+} \phi \vee \phi^{\prime} & \text { iff } & w \vDash^{+} \phi \text { or } w \vDash^{+} \phi^{\prime} & w \vDash^{-} \phi \vee \phi^{\prime} & \text { iff } & w \vDash^{-} \phi \text { and } w \vDash^{-} \phi^{\prime}
\end{array}
$$

## Associating $\mathscr{L}_{\mathrm{BD}}$-formulas to events

Recall that in the classical logic, each formula $\phi$ corresponds to its extension $\|\phi\|=$ $\{w: w \vDash \phi\}$. If $\|\phi\|=W, \phi$ can be considered true, and if $\phi$ is always true, it is valid.

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Recall that in the classical logic, each formula $\phi$ corresponds to its extension $\|\phi\|=$ $\{w: w \vDash \phi\}$. If $\|\phi\|=W, \phi$ can be considered true, and if $\phi$ is always true, it is valid.

Extensions of $\mathscr{L}_{\text {BD }}$ formulas
Every $\mathscr{L}_{\mathrm{BD}}$ formula has positive and negative extensions:

$$
|\phi|^{+}:=\left\{w \in W \mid w \vDash^{+} \phi\right\} \quad|\phi|^{-}:=\left\{w \in W \mid w \vDash^{-} \phi\right\}
$$

Additionally, we define pure belief, pure disbelief, conflict, and uncertainty in $\phi$ :

$$
|\phi|^{\mathrm{b}}=|\phi|^{+} \backslash|\phi|^{-} \quad|\phi|^{\mathrm{d}}=|\phi|^{-} \backslash|\phi|^{+} \quad|\phi|^{\mathrm{c}}=|\phi|^{+} \cap|\phi|^{-} \quad|\phi|^{\mathrm{u}}=W \backslash\left(|\phi|^{+} \cup|\phi|^{-}\right)
$$

Validity in BD
$\phi \vdash \chi$ is satisfied on $\mathfrak{M}=\left\langle W, v^{+}, v^{-}\right\rangle(\mathfrak{M} \models[\phi \vdash \chi])$ iff $|\phi|^{+} \subseteq|\chi|^{+}$and $|\chi|^{-} \subseteq|\phi|^{-}$. $\phi \vdash \chi$ is BD-valid $\left(\phi=_{\mathrm{BD}} \chi\right)$ iff it is satisfied on every model.

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## Probabilities on BD models: two ways

Definition (BD models with $\pm$-probabilities: $\mathfrak{M}_{\mu}=\langle\mathfrak{M}, \mu\rangle, \mu: 2^{W} \rightarrow[0,1]$ )

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text { mon: } & \text { if } X \subseteq Y \text {, then } \mu(X) \leq \mu(Y) \\
\text { neg: } & \mu\left(|\phi|^{-}\right)=\mu\left(|\neg \phi|^{+}\right) \\
\text {ex: } & \mu\left(|\phi \vee \chi|^{+}\right)=\mu\left(|\phi|^{+}\right)+\mu\left(|\chi|^{+}\right)-\mu\left(|\phi \wedge \chi|^{+}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Definition (BD models with 4-probabilities: $\mathfrak{M}_{\mathbf{4}}=\left\langle\mathfrak{M}, \mu_{\mathbf{4}}\right\rangle, \mu_{\mathbf{4}}: 2^{W} \rightarrow[0,1]$ )

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { part: } \mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{b}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{d}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{u}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right)=1 \\
\text { neg: } \mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\neg \phi|^{\mathrm{b}}\right)=\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{d}}\right), \mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\neg \phi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right)=\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right) \\
\text { contr: } \mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi \wedge \neg \phi|^{\mathrm{b}}\right)=0, \mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi \wedge \neg \phi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right)=\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

BCmon: if $\mathfrak{M} \vDash[\phi \vdash \chi]$, then $\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{b}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right) \leq \mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\chi|^{\mathrm{b}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\chi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right)$;
BCex: $\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{b}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\psi|^{\mathrm{b}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\psi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right)=\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi \wedge \psi|^{\mathrm{b}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}(\mid \phi \wedge$ $\left.\left.\psi\right|^{c}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi \vee \psi|^{b}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi \vee \psi|^{c}\right)$.

## Probabilities in BD: paraconsistency

Theorem (Klein, Majer, Raffie Rad; 2021)
For every BD model with a $\pm$-probability $\left\langle W, v^{+}, v^{-}, \mu\right\rangle$ (resp., BD model with 4probability $\left\langle W, v^{+}, v^{-}, \mu_{4}\right\rangle$ ), there is a BD model $\left\langle W^{\prime}, v^{\prime+}, v^{\prime-}, \pi\right\rangle$ with a classical probability measure $\pi$ s.t. $\pi\left(|\phi|^{+}\right)=\mu\left(|\phi|^{+}\right)\left(\right.$resp., $\pi\left(|\phi|^{\times}\right)=\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\times}\right)$for $\mathrm{x} \in\{\mathrm{b}, \mathrm{d}, \mathrm{c}, \mathrm{u}\}$ )

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## Example (Non-classical events)

Consider the following BD model.

$$
w_{0}: p^{ \pm}, \nless<w_{1}: p^{-}, q^{-}
$$

Let $\mu=\mu_{4}$ be defined as follows: $\mu\left(\left\{w_{0}\right\}\right)=\frac{2}{3}, \mu\left(\left\{w_{1}\right\}\right)=\frac{1}{3}, \mu(W)=1, \mu(\varnothing)=0$. We have

$$
\mu\left(|p \wedge \neg p|^{+}\right)=\frac{2}{3} \quad \mu\left(|q \vee \neg q|^{+}\right)=\frac{1}{3} \quad \mu\left(|p \wedge \neg q|^{\text {d }}\right)=1 \quad \mu\left(|p \vee q|^{\mathrm{u}}\right)=0
$$

## (1) A logic for non-classical event description

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## Two-layered logics

We want to formalise reasoning about $\pm$ - and 4 -probabilities. Thus, we need logics that can express addition and subtraction and incorporate event descriptions in BD.

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Two-layered logics - the idea

- Use BD to describe events.
- Use modal formulas $\mathrm{M} \phi$ to stand for the measure of the event corresponding to $\phi$.
- Use (an expansion of) Łukasiewicz logic to reason about these measures and encode their axioms.


## The logic of 4-probabilities

$$
\mathscr{L}_{4 \mathrm{Pr}^{\mathrm{t}} \triangle} \ni \alpha:=\mathrm{Bl} \phi|\mathrm{Db} \phi| \mathrm{Cf} \phi|\mathrm{Uc} \phi| \sim \alpha|\triangle \alpha|(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha) \quad\left(\phi \in \mathscr{L}_{\mathrm{BD}}\right)
$$

A $4 \mathrm{Pr}^{\mathrm{t}} \Delta$ model is a tuple $\mathbb{M}=\left\langle\mathfrak{M}, \mu_{4}, e\right\rangle$ with $\left\langle\mathfrak{M}, \mu_{4}\right\rangle$ being a BD model with 4probability s.t. $e(\mathrm{Bl} \phi)=\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{b}}\right), e(\mathrm{Db} \phi)=\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{d}}\right), e(\mathrm{Cf} \phi)=\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right), e(\mathrm{Uc} \phi)=$ $\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{u}}\right)$. The values of complex formulas are computed as follows:
$e(\sim \alpha)=1-e(\alpha) \quad e(\alpha \rightarrow \beta)=\min (1,1-e(\alpha)+e(\beta)) \quad e(\Delta \alpha)= \begin{cases}1 & \text { if } e(\alpha)=1 \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}$
We say that $\alpha$ is $\mathbf{4} \mathrm{Pr}^{\mathrm{t}} \Delta$ valid iff $e(\alpha)=1$ in every model.

## The logic of $\pm$-probabilities

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathscr{L}_{\operatorname{Pr}_{\Delta}^{t^{2}}} \ni \alpha:=\operatorname{Pr} \phi|\sim \alpha| \neg \alpha|\triangle \alpha|(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha) \tag{BD}
\end{equation*}
$$

A $\operatorname{Pr}_{\Delta}^{\mathrm{t}^{2}}$ model is a tuple $\mathbb{M}=\left\langle\mathfrak{M}, \mu, e_{1}, e_{2}\right\rangle$ with $\langle\mathfrak{M}, \mu\rangle$ being a BD model with $\pm$ probability and $e_{1}, e_{2}: \mathscr{L}_{\operatorname{Pr}_{\Delta}^{2}} \rightarrow[0,1]$ s.t. $e_{1}(\operatorname{Pr} \phi)=\mu\left(|\phi|^{+}\right), e_{2}(\operatorname{Pr} \phi)=\mu\left(|\phi|^{-}\right)$. The values of complex formulas are computed as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
e_{1}(\neg \alpha) & =e_{2}(\alpha) & e_{2}(\neg \alpha) & =e_{1}(\alpha) \\
e_{1}(\sim \alpha) & =1-e_{1}(\alpha) & e_{2}(\sim \alpha) & =1-e_{2}(\alpha) \\
e_{1}(\triangle \alpha) & =\left\{\begin{array}{lll}
1 & \text { if } e_{1}(\alpha)=1 \\
0 & \text { otherwise }
\end{array}\right. & e_{2}(\triangle \alpha) & = \begin{cases}1 & \text { if } e_{2}(\alpha)>0 \\
0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases} \\
e_{1}(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) & =\min \left(1,1-e_{1}(\alpha)+e_{1}(\beta)\right) & e_{2}(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) & =\max \left(0, e_{2}(\beta)-e_{2}(\alpha)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

We say that $\alpha$ is $\operatorname{Pr}_{\Delta}^{\mathrm{t}^{2}}$ valid iff $e(\alpha)=(1,0)$ in every model.

## From events to two-layered formulas

Example (Non-classical events)
Recall our BD model.

$$
w_{0}: p^{ \pm}, \not \subset \quad w_{1}: p^{-}, q^{-}
$$

Let $\mu=\mu_{4}$ be defined as follows: $\mu\left(\left\{w_{0}\right\}\right)=\frac{2}{3}, \mu\left(\left\{w_{1}\right\}\right)=\frac{1}{3}, \mu(W)=1, \mu(\varnothing)=0$. We have

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\mu\left(|p \wedge \neg p|^{+}\right)=\frac{2}{3} \quad \mu\left(|p \wedge \neg p|^{-}\right)=1 \quad \mu\left(|p \wedge \neg q|^{\mathrm{d}}\right)=1 \quad \mu\left(|p \vee q|^{\mathrm{u}}\right)=0
$$

Thus, the values are: $e(\operatorname{Pr}(p \wedge \neg p))=\left(\frac{2}{3}, 1\right), e(\operatorname{Db}(p \wedge \neg q))=1, e(\mathrm{Uc}(p \vee q))=0$.

## Equivalence

$\pm$-probabilities and 4-probabilities are equivalent. How to show that their corresponding logics are equivalent as well?

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From $\operatorname{Pr}_{\triangle}^{t^{2}}$ to $4 \mathrm{Pr}^{\mathrm{t}} \Delta$
Note that $\neg \operatorname{Pr} \phi$ is equivalent to $\operatorname{Pr} \neg \phi$ and that $\mathscr{L}_{\operatorname{Pr}_{\Delta}^{t^{2}}}$-formulas admit $\neg$ NNFs. Thus, we can eliminate $\neg$ 's. After that, we apply the following translation.

$$
(\operatorname{Pr} \phi)^{4}=\operatorname{Bl} \phi \oplus \operatorname{Cf} \phi \quad(\sim \alpha)^{4}=\sim \alpha^{4} \quad(\triangle \alpha)^{4}=\triangle \alpha^{4} \quad\left(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha^{\prime}\right)^{4}=\alpha^{4} \rightarrow \alpha^{\prime 4}
$$

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$$

From $4 \mathrm{Pr}^{\mathrm{t}} \triangle$ to $\mathrm{Pr}_{\triangle}^{\mathrm{t}^{2}}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
(\mathrm{Bl} \phi)^{ \pm} & =\operatorname{Pr} \phi \ominus \operatorname{Pr}(\phi \wedge \neg \phi) & (\mathrm{Cf} \phi)^{ \pm}=\operatorname{Pr}(\phi \wedge \neg \phi) & (\mathrm{Uc} \phi)^{ \pm}=\sim \operatorname{Pr}(\phi \vee \neg \phi) \\
(\mathrm{Db} \phi)^{ \pm} & =\operatorname{Pr} \neg \phi \ominus \operatorname{Pr}(\phi \wedge \neg \phi) & (\sim \beta)^{ \pm}=\sim \beta^{ \pm} & \\
\left(\beta \rightarrow \beta^{\prime}\right)^{ \pm} & =\beta^{ \pm} \rightarrow \beta^{\prime \pm} & &
\end{aligned}
$$

## Axiomatisation of 4-probabilities

To produce the Hilbert-style axiomatisation, we just need to translate the conditions on $\mu_{4}$ into formulas. For example, $\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{b}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{d}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{u}}\right)+\mu_{\mathbf{4}}\left(|\phi|^{\mathrm{c}}\right)=1$ is going to be represented as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{Bl} \phi \oplus \mathrm{Db} \phi \oplus \mathrm{Cf} \phi \oplus \mathrm{Uc} \phi \\
&\left(\left(\mathrm{X}_{1} \phi \oplus \mathrm{X}_{2} \phi \oplus \mathrm{X}_{3} \phi \oplus \mathrm{X}_{4} \phi\right) \ominus \mathrm{X}_{4} \phi\right) \leftrightarrow\left(\mathrm{X}_{1} \phi \oplus \mathrm{X}_{2} \phi \oplus \mathrm{X}_{3} \phi\right) \\
&\left(\mathrm{X}_{i} \neq \mathrm{X}_{j}, \mathrm{X}_{i} \in\{\mathrm{BI}, \mathrm{Db}, \mathrm{Cf}, \mathrm{Uc}\}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

To prove the completeness of the calculus, we use the completeness of $\mathrm{t}_{\triangle}$ w.r.t. finite theories and encode the properties of the measure with probabilistic axioms.

## Complexity

Reduction of probabilistic proofs to $Ł_{\triangle}-$ proofs immediately gives us decidability (and NP-hardness) of $\mathrm{Pr}_{\Delta}^{\mathrm{t}^{2}}$ and $4 \mathrm{Pr}^{\mathrm{t}} \Delta$. We can establish NP-completeness by using constraint tableaux for $Ł_{\Delta}$ and reducing $4 \mathrm{Pr}^{Ł_{\Delta}}$-formulas to instances of the bounded Mixed-Integer Problem.

## What next?

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Weaker 4-measures:

- belief functions,
- plausibilities,
- possibilities,


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- belief functions,
- plausibilities,
- possibilities,
- ...

Stronger languages for event descriptions:

- add implication,
- add ' $p$ is (non-)classical',
- add ' $p$ is true',


## Thank you for your attention!

